Pakistan at a Crossroads?

Ahmed Rashid, author of "Taliban" and "Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia" wrote a column for the Washington Post today:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/15/AR2007061502073_pf.html

In the column, he illuminates the struggle occurring in Pakistan at this moment. Beginning 3 months ago, Pervez Musharraf, prime minister of Pakistan, effectively fired a supreme court justice. In other times, this may have gone unnoticed. But when Pakistan is on the front doorstep of (and some would argue behind) the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT: Yes, John Edwards, there is an Osama bin Laden), this story makes international news.

As you may recall from one of my previous readings, Pakistan has a history, since its beginnings in the late 1940's, of military rule. In fact, when the military has not ruled the country, it typically comes in to "save" the country from non-military rule, which inevitably leads to corruption. Musharraf, who has been in power since 1999, led a coup ousting the previously elected official, Nawaz Sharif.

Rather than sit by idly as Musharraf consolidates power and stifles dissent, especially in an election year, the supreme court judge, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudry, began a protest. This protest has led to the justice system in Pakistan coming to a halt. Lawyers are effectively on strike. And while this may be a good thing in most developed nations, this is a very bad thing in Pakistan. But with the military as the official purveyor of justice in the country, the people of Pakistan, and indeed the international community may begin to call the military's bluff. This bluff has been that military rule is less bad than the alternative, which of course, is militant fundamentalist rule.

That may be so, but will the nation really elect militant fundamentalists, en masse? It is hard to predict, but I say no. Maybe it is time for Musharraf and his largest supporter, the United States, to practice what they preach and allow true republican democracy flourish.

Hot Fun in the Spring Time

This last week, the mercury reached upwards of 90 degrees here in Portland. This is not unusual (in 1995, before I moved here, the Grateful Dead were touring and I think it reached north of 100 degrees over Memorial Day weekend).

Attached are recent pictures of Parker over the past week or so.

"Dereliction of Duty" by H.R. McMaster

I started reading this book for 2 primary reasons. First, H.R. McMaster is a colonel in the United States Army. He led the 3rd Armed Cavalry Regiment into al-Anbar province in Iraq in early 2005 and was profiled by numerous media sources including the Washington Post's Thomas Ricks and "Frontline" on PBS. After reading about what he was doing (traditional counterinsurgency operations) while much of the rest of the Army seemed to be in a "search and destroy" mode, I gained much respect for the man.

The second reason I chose this book was because I realized what little knowledge I have on the war in Vietnam. All of what I have ever read or seen or heard has seemed to come from sides with a vested interest.

Despite his military background, I believe McMaster's account of the initial stages of the war in Vietnam is extremely critical, not just of civilian leadership, but also of military leadership, including the joint chiefs and General William Westmoreland.

McMaster's primary thesis is that two domestic political goals drove President Lyndon Johnson's approach to Vietnam: getting elected to the presidency in 1964 and getting his "Great Society" domestic social programs passed. Ultimately, his military advisors simply gave advice conforming to Johnson's objectives as he attempted to find a "third" way: avoid war and avoid withdrawal.

Johnson's strengths as a Senate leader contributed to his weakness as an executive. This is an important lesson as we approach the presidential election season. In fact, this negative quality was on full display in the most recent election in Senator John Kerry, who often seemed to attempt to forge a consensus, rather than staking out his own policy positions. Once again, this is a necessary quality in a senator, but a detriment to the presidency.

At the end of the day, McMaster tells us that we lost the Vietnam War long before we ever got engaged. We were fighting to sap the will of the insurgents (contradictory to classic counterinsurgency operations). Under Kennedy's leadership, we overthrew an unpopular sitting president and had little South Vietnamese political support thereafter. Finally, we were fighting for a population (the South Vietnamese) who did not want our help.

The underlying tale of this book is that a President needs unbiased advisors who can provide him with advice he does not want to hear. Both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson relied upon a small group of confidants to give them advice they wanted to hear. This is a very dangerous situation.