"Dereliction of Duty" by H.R. McMaster

I started reading this book for 2 primary reasons. First, H.R. McMaster is a colonel in the United States Army. He led the 3rd Armed Cavalry Regiment into al-Anbar province in Iraq in early 2005 and was profiled by numerous media sources including the Washington Post's Thomas Ricks and "Frontline" on PBS. After reading about what he was doing (traditional counterinsurgency operations) while much of the rest of the Army seemed to be in a "search and destroy" mode, I gained much respect for the man.

The second reason I chose this book was because I realized what little knowledge I have on the war in Vietnam. All of what I have ever read or seen or heard has seemed to come from sides with a vested interest.

Despite his military background, I believe McMaster's account of the initial stages of the war in Vietnam is extremely critical, not just of civilian leadership, but also of military leadership, including the joint chiefs and General William Westmoreland.

McMaster's primary thesis is that two domestic political goals drove President Lyndon Johnson's approach to Vietnam: getting elected to the presidency in 1964 and getting his "Great Society" domestic social programs passed. Ultimately, his military advisors simply gave advice conforming to Johnson's objectives as he attempted to find a "third" way: avoid war and avoid withdrawal.

Johnson's strengths as a Senate leader contributed to his weakness as an executive. This is an important lesson as we approach the presidential election season. In fact, this negative quality was on full display in the most recent election in Senator John Kerry, who often seemed to attempt to forge a consensus, rather than staking out his own policy positions. Once again, this is a necessary quality in a senator, but a detriment to the presidency.

At the end of the day, McMaster tells us that we lost the Vietnam War long before we ever got engaged. We were fighting to sap the will of the insurgents (contradictory to classic counterinsurgency operations). Under Kennedy's leadership, we overthrew an unpopular sitting president and had little South Vietnamese political support thereafter. Finally, we were fighting for a population (the South Vietnamese) who did not want our help.

The underlying tale of this book is that a President needs unbiased advisors who can provide him with advice he does not want to hear. Both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson relied upon a small group of confidants to give them advice they wanted to hear. This is a very dangerous situation.