Sunday, November 18, 2007
How is the Military Like Goldman Sachs?
The crux of the article was that this ocurred because of the culture at Goldman. Everything from its roots as a partnership to its 360 degree executive reviews have to its management's choice of acquisitions have gone into building the "Goldman Model."
In yesterday's Washington Post, Anne Scott Tyson (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/16/AR2007111602258.html?nav=most_emailed_emailafriend) has noted a transformation ocurring within the United States Army; one which sounds surprisingly like the "Goldman Model." General David Patreus, commander of forces in Iraq, has been briefly called back stateside to assist in the promotion boards of Colonels to the rank of Brigadier General. Historically, this promotion has ocurred because the Colonel in question has caught the eye of his superior, who would nominate him for this promotion. Often, these colonels were politically experienced with significant Washington credentials on their resumes (read that as meaning staff positions instead of combat postings).
General Patreus, who re-wrote the counterinsurgency (COIN) manual for the army, is beginning to rewrite the promotion manual. It would appear that they have begun the 360 degree review process (or reviews not only by your superiors, but also by your subordinates and colleagues), they are valuing combat experience more and even paying extravagent (by Army, not Goldman, standards) retention bonuses to keep experienced officers in the service.
Will the US Army be as successful as Goldman Sachs? One can only hope.
Sunday, November 04, 2007
Halloween with the Little Man
Arthritis Update
I am hopeful that I can retain this progress. Of course, the drug could lose its effectiveness at any time, but in the meantime, I am very pleased.
Welcome Back, Cotter
The New York Times has run an article this morning, "The War on Poppy Succeeds, but Cannabis Thrives in an Afghan Province." ( http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/04/world/asia/04cannabis.html)
All I have to say about that is Hallelujah! The world could do with a few less heroin junkies and more people smoking weed. Or does the New York Times think this is a problem? Of course, I don't condone people do any drugs, but if you are going to do one, it is better that you use marijuana than opium or smack (or alcohol for that matter).
Saturday, August 25, 2007
A New Chapter In My Life Revisted
In all honesty, the disease has progressed to the point where I was seriously considering purchasing a cane to assist my walking. I was dealing with pain on a daily basis which literally felt as though I were 80 years old. Every time I stood up, I required the assistance of a table or a desk or a wall. Every time I lifted my left arm above shoulder level, I required assistance from my right arm.
Every day, I took 4 Alleve pills. This helped me cope, but I was unable to act like an ordinary 30-year old.
That is, until last Wednesday. Last Wednesday, I began a prescription of Humira. This is in addition to my Alleve, Folic Acid and Methotrexate (none of which were very effective in helping me cope with my pain). Within 3 hours, I was noticing a significant difference. On the first night, I chalked it up to painkillers and coffee. The next morning, however, I noticed less pain in my shoulder and my feet when I stepped out of bed. On Friday, I felt nearly no pain standing up.
It is safe to say that I feel better now than I have felt in months. This could certainly be a placebo effect (the medicine appears likely to require 3 months to be effective). It could be that I am eating nearly a dozen dried dates each day and am back on my water regiment. It could be any number of things, but one thing is for certain. I feel as though I am in my 30's and I thank God for that.
Saturday, August 18, 2007
"A CBS Reality Show Draws a Claim of Possible Child Abuse"
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/18/arts/television/18kid.html?ei=5090&en=081d627066c74b98&ex=1345089600&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=print
Pictures to be Forgotten
Parker in the Summer of 2007
Thursday, July 26, 2007
Saying Good Bye to CdA for Now
Dinner at Mom's House
Sonsteng/Needham Family Barbecue
Moneyball
Moneyball follows baseball's Oakland A's general manager Billy Beane through the 2002 season. Beane is different than most GM's. Rather than trading for high-priced, homerun hitting power or high-priced, fastball throwing arms, he looks at different metrics for success in professional baseball.
The metrics, which were initially highlighted by writer, Bill James (now a consultant with the Boston Redsox) show the importance of on-base % and slugging %. Basically, the stats highlighted the importance of not getting out. It also uses statistics in drafting players and as it relates to certain kinds of plays (i.e. bunting and stealing bases).
By using these metrics, instead of say batting average or home runs, Billy Beane's A's have put together several very successful seasons, including on-base %, the A's regular season record in the Billy Beane era has been (excluding this year) 825 - 632. This equates to a 57% winning %. Not too bad.
Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam
It takes an interesting examination between the two largest, most recent counterinsurgency operations that have been undertaken. The first of these was the British in Malaya and the second was the Americans in Vietnam. Lt Col Nagl examines the insurrections that began each countries' involvement in these wars and the learning curve that each country applied while adapting to the enemy.
This book was interesting because the British were successful in Malaya. They were fighting a communist insurgency, as we did in Vietnam. What allowed them to be successful and for us to fail?
Lt Col Nagl points out that it took a couple of years of missteps for the British to learn how to fight the Malayan insurgents. However, a bright commander decided that they needed to fight the enemy the same way they fought insurgents in Burma in World War II. Additionally, they drew from their institutional knowledge of managing local populations during their colonial expansion from the 1700's on.
The Americans also drew from their World War II experience, which taught them that the key to victory was to apply so much pressure as to force acquiescence. However, this is not possible in an insurgency. Air strikes do not court the favor of the local population (neither does deforestation through spraying Agent Orange). Our error (that was never corrected) was that we wanted to fight a large-scale, high technology brand of warfare. However, as I have heard before, our enemy has a say in this, and our enemy was not equipped to fight this kind of war. Instead, he chose to attack and retreat into the population. When we fire back into the population, we lose credibility and end up unable to distinguish between our enemy and the general population (a common criticism of the war in Vietnam). Further, no matter how unsuccessful our efforts, commanders continued to want to fight a large-scale, high technology battle.
This book was originally written in 1997. It is very instructive as to what is required when we find ourselves fighting a local insurgency. While it has taken 4 years, I feel we have finally learned and changed our tactics to reflect this learning in Iraq.
Sunday, July 15, 2007
Parker's 3rd Haircut
Proposed Solutions to Climate Change
In practice, however, this does not help. The Marlins will continue to field non-competitive teams and the only thing that will happen is that the Yankees will subsidize their owners who are now monetarily incentivized not to compete.
As in baseball, agreements like the Kyoto protocol or carbon trading will not hinder the developed world's consumption of carbon (yes it will get more expensive), but it will not likely reduce their consumption much, and the developing economies will recieve payments to not consume carbon. In other words, the leaders of countries will receive money to not develop their nations and stay poor. Of course, the leaders of those countries will not stay poor. Developed Europe will be paying them to keep their countries poor. That makes sense?
As is widely reported (and plainly evident why from above), schemes like carbon trading are not likely to make much difference at all in global climate (at most 1/2 degree centigrade in 50 years).
This is why if you believe that we must cut carbon consumption, more drastic measures must be taken. A carbon tax is probably the most sensible and congruent with American values of freedom (as opposed to European values of equality). In reality, if we are looking to dramatically cut carbon emissions, enough to make a significant change in global climate 50 years hence, some very draconian measures must be taken.
The Washington Post details some of these changes this morning (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/14/AR2007071401246_2.html). They include:
- Automobiles will need to double their miles per gallon (this will likely preclude the production of trucks, including SUV's, for personal use)
- Homes will likely need to produced at much smaller sizes (perhaps less than 2000 square feet)
- Electricity bills will probably need to be taxed significantly to pay for retooling America's power plant. This would probably need to be progressive, i.e. if you consume more than 1500 kWh per month, your cost per kWh will rise dramatically
- Land will likely need to be re-forrested, capping development and driving up the price of real-estate
I appreciate people's desire to reduce their carbon emissions. I am doing so myself (although I have my own sinister reasons), but I find that people are unwilling to do anything about it themselves. Further, they don't comprehend the kind of changes they will necessarily be subject to. Imagine this scenario:
It is the Summer and 100 degrees outside. You are running your air conditioning, which consumes energy. Because you have consumed more than the uncapped amount, the cost of your energy triples for every kWh over the stated maximum. So whereas a kWh costs $0.08 up to 1500, during the hot spell, your energy consumption is 2500 kWh, and your bill goes from $200 to $360 with taxes included. This is enough to take your breath away. Imagine that argument in Congress, especially regarding poor people.
Or imagine this, your property taxes on a 2,000 square foot home are $3,000 per year (or $1.50 per square foot). Your neighbor has a 3,000 square foot home. Taxes above 2,000 square feet are $4.50 per square foot, so his property tax bill is $7,500.
These are the kinds of measure that would be required for actually putting a dent in US carbon emissions. So when the President says this will put a dent in our economy, he is not kidding. Think about this next time you are pushing for the government to enact some kinds of legislation to curb carbon emissions. Frankly, I am all for it, but the fiscal consequences could be significant and would almost certainly impact our economy.
Saturday, July 14, 2007
Insurgency in Iraq
The article provides an interesting look into the structure, coordination and mindset of the insurgent groups in Iraq. It also featured a plea, appealing to American popular opinion to support a redeployment of troops away from the center of the country.
The insurgent leader, going by the nom de guerre Abu Sarhan (father of first born son, Sarhan), suggests that America's recent counterinsurgency operations have increased the attacks against Americans. That is fairly self-evident. Abu Sarhan suggests that the insurgent groups are not against what America is trying to do, but they are taking the wrong path. They like America, but hate Shiites and only ask that America get out of the way so they may intensify the battle (civil war) against Shiite militias. America can do this by removing the cordons around Baghdad communities, withdrawing soldiers and stop looking for Sunni insurgents.
While this article seems to be a thinly veiled perspective that our efforts are futile, I disagree wholeheartedly. I believe that anyone who believes that we are making an appropriate counter-insurgent effort can see that our efforts are working. The insurgent groups are asking us to stop it. From a political perspective, this implies that we are starting to win over the support of communities in and around Baghdad. That is an excellent reason to continue the operations.
But it is important to realize that the more troops we have in harm's way, the more casualties our soldiers will face in the near term. One of the most important reasons we are seeing more casualties now than we have seen in recent years is because troops are actively engaged on the front lines and are living in the communities in which they are patrolling, as opposed to dozens of miles away in protected enclaves known as FOB's (or forward operating bases).
As Abu Sarhan notes in the article, the solution to this conflict is political. But we cannot get a favorable political solution without security. After all, if you are a Sunni or a Shiite in a Baghdad neighborhood, all you want is safety to walk down the street and civil services, such as power, water, etc. back. And you will provide information to the Americans (i.e. where the IED's are hidden) only if you believe they will protect you against the bad guys. If they believe the Americans will be redeploying and jeopardizing their safety, they won't help the Americans at all.
Finally, the article is instructive as to the consequences of American withdrawal from its counterinsurgency operations: a significant enhancement of the civil war in Baghdad. Everyone wants to compare this fight to Vietnam, but a more apt comparison is probably to Lebanon in the 1980's. As we pulled out, a devastating civil war broke out which, to this day, has not gotten better, as we can see by recent Lebanese military action into refugee camps. Perhaps this is the model we should be prepared to accept should American forces withdraw: Baghdad looking like Beirut.
Monday, July 09, 2007
The Post Surge Strategy
I appreciate politicians trying to do to find compromise between "surge" and "withdraw," but my question for Senator Luger is, "What should we do if all hell breaks loose." Should we send our soldiers into a melee? Frankly, I think this is a ludicrous solution. Our policy makers have two clear options in this scenario: continue the counterinsurgency or withdraw all of our forces. Period. In this particular scenario, there is no middle ground.
Regardless of how we got here, we need to determine what are the consequences of our actions. What is the least bad option? Some politicians (including my beloved Ron Paul) would like to argue that, as in Vietnam, people argued about all the possible negative outcomes and the results weren't as bad as advertised. I can't say exactly if that is true. What I do know is that the North Vietnamese army exacted revenge upon those who cooperated with Americans to the tune of the deaths and incarcerations of tens of thousands of South Vietnamese. Additionally, our withdrawal created instability in the region, perhaps allowing the genocide in Cambodia to begin shortly thereafter.
Will that happen again? Is working for stability in the Middle East in the US interest? Will instability in the region be decreased or enhanced by our precipitous withdrawal? My guess is that stability in this region is in our interest and this will be enhanced by our counterinsurgency efforts. However, only history will be able to say.
For a good primer on exactly what is entailed in the "Surge," please see the following link:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/06/understanding-current-operatio/