Insurgency in Iraq

This morning's Washington Post featured and article by Joshua Partlow (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/13/AR2007071301792_pf.html), which is certainly worth reading. In the article, Mr. Partlow interviewed a member of an insurgent group's leadership who attempted to diagnose the United States' problems in Iraq.

The article provides an interesting look into the structure, coordination and mindset of the insurgent groups in Iraq. It also featured a plea, appealing to American popular opinion to support a redeployment of troops away from the center of the country.

The insurgent leader, going by the nom de guerre Abu Sarhan (father of first born son, Sarhan), suggests that America's recent counterinsurgency operations have increased the attacks against Americans. That is fairly self-evident. Abu Sarhan suggests that the insurgent groups are not against what America is trying to do, but they are taking the wrong path. They like America, but hate Shiites and only ask that America get out of the way so they may intensify the battle (civil war) against Shiite militias. America can do this by removing the cordons around Baghdad communities, withdrawing soldiers and stop looking for Sunni insurgents.

While this article seems to be a thinly veiled perspective that our efforts are futile, I disagree wholeheartedly. I believe that anyone who believes that we are making an appropriate counter-insurgent effort can see that our efforts are working. The insurgent groups are asking us to stop it. From a political perspective, this implies that we are starting to win over the support of communities in and around Baghdad. That is an excellent reason to continue the operations.

But it is important to realize that the more troops we have in harm's way, the more casualties our soldiers will face in the near term. One of the most important reasons we are seeing more casualties now than we have seen in recent years is because troops are actively engaged on the front lines and are living in the communities in which they are patrolling, as opposed to dozens of miles away in protected enclaves known as FOB's (or forward operating bases).

As Abu Sarhan notes in the article, the solution to this conflict is political. But we cannot get a favorable political solution without security. After all, if you are a Sunni or a Shiite in a Baghdad neighborhood, all you want is safety to walk down the street and civil services, such as power, water, etc. back. And you will provide information to the Americans (i.e. where the IED's are hidden) only if you believe they will protect you against the bad guys. If they believe the Americans will be redeploying and jeopardizing their safety, they won't help the Americans at all.

Finally, the article is instructive as to the consequences of American withdrawal from its counterinsurgency operations: a significant enhancement of the civil war in Baghdad. Everyone wants to compare this fight to Vietnam, but a more apt comparison is probably to Lebanon in the 1980's. As we pulled out, a devastating civil war broke out which, to this day, has not gotten better, as we can see by recent Lebanese military action into refugee camps. Perhaps this is the model we should be prepared to accept should American forces withdraw: Baghdad looking like Beirut.