On Tuesday, July 24th, we ended our vacation up in Cda/Spokane. We had a great time and look forward to returning soon.
Thursday, July 26, 2007
Dinner at Mom's House
On Sunday night, July 22nd, we had a Mexican-themed dinner at my Mom's house. We had El Dorado Beef Cheese Caserole, Enchiladas and pinto beans. Aside from my family that lives in Coeur d' Alene, my cousin Janet and her daughter Christine also were in town.Sonsteng/Needham Family Barbecue
On Saturday, July 21st, we had a family barbecue at Kim's house in Spokane. It probably could be aptly described as a family union/reunion.
Moneyball
Moneyball was written by Michael Lewis. This is not the first time I have read a Michael Lewis book. The first was Liar's Poker, and this was every bit as interesting.
Moneyball follows baseball's Oakland A's general manager Billy Beane through the 2002 season. Beane is different than most GM's. Rather than trading for high-priced, homerun hitting power or high-priced, fastball throwing arms, he looks at different metrics for success in professional baseball.
The metrics, which were initially highlighted by writer, Bill James (now a consultant with the Boston Redsox) show the importance of on-base % and slugging %. Basically, the stats highlighted the importance of not getting out. It also uses statistics in drafting players and as it relates to certain kinds of plays (i.e. bunting and stealing bases).
By using these metrics, instead of say batting average or home runs, Billy Beane's A's have put together several very successful seasons, including on-base %, the A's regular season record in the Billy Beane era has been (excluding this year) 825 - 632. This equates to a 57% winning %. Not too bad.
Moneyball follows baseball's Oakland A's general manager Billy Beane through the 2002 season. Beane is different than most GM's. Rather than trading for high-priced, homerun hitting power or high-priced, fastball throwing arms, he looks at different metrics for success in professional baseball.
The metrics, which were initially highlighted by writer, Bill James (now a consultant with the Boston Redsox) show the importance of on-base % and slugging %. Basically, the stats highlighted the importance of not getting out. It also uses statistics in drafting players and as it relates to certain kinds of plays (i.e. bunting and stealing bases).
By using these metrics, instead of say batting average or home runs, Billy Beane's A's have put together several very successful seasons, including on-base %, the A's regular season record in the Billy Beane era has been (excluding this year) 825 - 632. This equates to a 57% winning %. Not too bad.
Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam
This book was written by Lt Col John A Nagl, a PhD, with an update from his own experiences in Iraq at the beginning of the current war.
It takes an interesting examination between the two largest, most recent counterinsurgency operations that have been undertaken. The first of these was the British in Malaya and the second was the Americans in Vietnam. Lt Col Nagl examines the insurrections that began each countries' involvement in these wars and the learning curve that each country applied while adapting to the enemy.
This book was interesting because the British were successful in Malaya. They were fighting a communist insurgency, as we did in Vietnam. What allowed them to be successful and for us to fail?
Lt Col Nagl points out that it took a couple of years of missteps for the British to learn how to fight the Malayan insurgents. However, a bright commander decided that they needed to fight the enemy the same way they fought insurgents in Burma in World War II. Additionally, they drew from their institutional knowledge of managing local populations during their colonial expansion from the 1700's on.
The Americans also drew from their World War II experience, which taught them that the key to victory was to apply so much pressure as to force acquiescence. However, this is not possible in an insurgency. Air strikes do not court the favor of the local population (neither does deforestation through spraying Agent Orange). Our error (that was never corrected) was that we wanted to fight a large-scale, high technology brand of warfare. However, as I have heard before, our enemy has a say in this, and our enemy was not equipped to fight this kind of war. Instead, he chose to attack and retreat into the population. When we fire back into the population, we lose credibility and end up unable to distinguish between our enemy and the general population (a common criticism of the war in Vietnam). Further, no matter how unsuccessful our efforts, commanders continued to want to fight a large-scale, high technology battle.
This book was originally written in 1997. It is very instructive as to what is required when we find ourselves fighting a local insurgency. While it has taken 4 years, I feel we have finally learned and changed our tactics to reflect this learning in Iraq.
It takes an interesting examination between the two largest, most recent counterinsurgency operations that have been undertaken. The first of these was the British in Malaya and the second was the Americans in Vietnam. Lt Col Nagl examines the insurrections that began each countries' involvement in these wars and the learning curve that each country applied while adapting to the enemy.
This book was interesting because the British were successful in Malaya. They were fighting a communist insurgency, as we did in Vietnam. What allowed them to be successful and for us to fail?
Lt Col Nagl points out that it took a couple of years of missteps for the British to learn how to fight the Malayan insurgents. However, a bright commander decided that they needed to fight the enemy the same way they fought insurgents in Burma in World War II. Additionally, they drew from their institutional knowledge of managing local populations during their colonial expansion from the 1700's on.
The Americans also drew from their World War II experience, which taught them that the key to victory was to apply so much pressure as to force acquiescence. However, this is not possible in an insurgency. Air strikes do not court the favor of the local population (neither does deforestation through spraying Agent Orange). Our error (that was never corrected) was that we wanted to fight a large-scale, high technology brand of warfare. However, as I have heard before, our enemy has a say in this, and our enemy was not equipped to fight this kind of war. Instead, he chose to attack and retreat into the population. When we fire back into the population, we lose credibility and end up unable to distinguish between our enemy and the general population (a common criticism of the war in Vietnam). Further, no matter how unsuccessful our efforts, commanders continued to want to fight a large-scale, high technology battle.
This book was originally written in 1997. It is very instructive as to what is required when we find ourselves fighting a local insurgency. While it has taken 4 years, I feel we have finally learned and changed our tactics to reflect this learning in Iraq.
Sunday, July 15, 2007
Parker's 3rd Haircut
As you know, we are going to Coeur d' Alene on Thursday. We haven't been back there since Kari's reunion in August 2003 (I skipped mine the following year). In light of this, it was time for Parker to become less hippy-fied and get a haircut. My brother-in-law, Thad, has been itching to give him a cut for some time. I hate to use someone's professional services without paying, but I understand that Thad insisted. Not only does it look great, it even smelled great.
Proposed Solutions to Climate Change
Thus far, the international community has come up with one solution to global climate change. That solution is like a salary cap in professional sports. However, unlike in professional sports, those teams who will exceed the salary cap (say the New York Yankees), can buy extra salary cap from those teams who will not exceed the salary cap (say the Florida Marlins). This system works great for both teams; the Yankees can spend to their heart's content and just pay a little extra whereas the Marlins can scrounge on payroll and receive payments from teams who are looking to spend.
In practice, however, this does not help. The Marlins will continue to field non-competitive teams and the only thing that will happen is that the Yankees will subsidize their owners who are now monetarily incentivized not to compete.
As in baseball, agreements like the Kyoto protocol or carbon trading will not hinder the developed world's consumption of carbon (yes it will get more expensive), but it will not likely reduce their consumption much, and the developing economies will recieve payments to not consume carbon. In other words, the leaders of countries will receive money to not develop their nations and stay poor. Of course, the leaders of those countries will not stay poor. Developed Europe will be paying them to keep their countries poor. That makes sense?
As is widely reported (and plainly evident why from above), schemes like carbon trading are not likely to make much difference at all in global climate (at most 1/2 degree centigrade in 50 years).
This is why if you believe that we must cut carbon consumption, more drastic measures must be taken. A carbon tax is probably the most sensible and congruent with American values of freedom (as opposed to European values of equality). In reality, if we are looking to dramatically cut carbon emissions, enough to make a significant change in global climate 50 years hence, some very draconian measures must be taken.
The Washington Post details some of these changes this morning (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/14/AR2007071401246_2.html). They include:
In practice, however, this does not help. The Marlins will continue to field non-competitive teams and the only thing that will happen is that the Yankees will subsidize their owners who are now monetarily incentivized not to compete.
As in baseball, agreements like the Kyoto protocol or carbon trading will not hinder the developed world's consumption of carbon (yes it will get more expensive), but it will not likely reduce their consumption much, and the developing economies will recieve payments to not consume carbon. In other words, the leaders of countries will receive money to not develop their nations and stay poor. Of course, the leaders of those countries will not stay poor. Developed Europe will be paying them to keep their countries poor. That makes sense?
As is widely reported (and plainly evident why from above), schemes like carbon trading are not likely to make much difference at all in global climate (at most 1/2 degree centigrade in 50 years).
This is why if you believe that we must cut carbon consumption, more drastic measures must be taken. A carbon tax is probably the most sensible and congruent with American values of freedom (as opposed to European values of equality). In reality, if we are looking to dramatically cut carbon emissions, enough to make a significant change in global climate 50 years hence, some very draconian measures must be taken.
The Washington Post details some of these changes this morning (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/14/AR2007071401246_2.html). They include:
- Automobiles will need to double their miles per gallon (this will likely preclude the production of trucks, including SUV's, for personal use)
- Homes will likely need to produced at much smaller sizes (perhaps less than 2000 square feet)
- Electricity bills will probably need to be taxed significantly to pay for retooling America's power plant. This would probably need to be progressive, i.e. if you consume more than 1500 kWh per month, your cost per kWh will rise dramatically
- Land will likely need to be re-forrested, capping development and driving up the price of real-estate
I appreciate people's desire to reduce their carbon emissions. I am doing so myself (although I have my own sinister reasons), but I find that people are unwilling to do anything about it themselves. Further, they don't comprehend the kind of changes they will necessarily be subject to. Imagine this scenario:
It is the Summer and 100 degrees outside. You are running your air conditioning, which consumes energy. Because you have consumed more than the uncapped amount, the cost of your energy triples for every kWh over the stated maximum. So whereas a kWh costs $0.08 up to 1500, during the hot spell, your energy consumption is 2500 kWh, and your bill goes from $200 to $360 with taxes included. This is enough to take your breath away. Imagine that argument in Congress, especially regarding poor people.
Or imagine this, your property taxes on a 2,000 square foot home are $3,000 per year (or $1.50 per square foot). Your neighbor has a 3,000 square foot home. Taxes above 2,000 square feet are $4.50 per square foot, so his property tax bill is $7,500.
These are the kinds of measure that would be required for actually putting a dent in US carbon emissions. So when the President says this will put a dent in our economy, he is not kidding. Think about this next time you are pushing for the government to enact some kinds of legislation to curb carbon emissions. Frankly, I am all for it, but the fiscal consequences could be significant and would almost certainly impact our economy.
Saturday, July 14, 2007
Insurgency in Iraq
This morning's Washington Post featured and article by Joshua Partlow (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/13/AR2007071301792_pf.html), which is certainly worth reading. In the article, Mr. Partlow interviewed a member of an insurgent group's leadership who attempted to diagnose the United States' problems in Iraq.
The article provides an interesting look into the structure, coordination and mindset of the insurgent groups in Iraq. It also featured a plea, appealing to American popular opinion to support a redeployment of troops away from the center of the country.
The insurgent leader, going by the nom de guerre Abu Sarhan (father of first born son, Sarhan), suggests that America's recent counterinsurgency operations have increased the attacks against Americans. That is fairly self-evident. Abu Sarhan suggests that the insurgent groups are not against what America is trying to do, but they are taking the wrong path. They like America, but hate Shiites and only ask that America get out of the way so they may intensify the battle (civil war) against Shiite militias. America can do this by removing the cordons around Baghdad communities, withdrawing soldiers and stop looking for Sunni insurgents.
While this article seems to be a thinly veiled perspective that our efforts are futile, I disagree wholeheartedly. I believe that anyone who believes that we are making an appropriate counter-insurgent effort can see that our efforts are working. The insurgent groups are asking us to stop it. From a political perspective, this implies that we are starting to win over the support of communities in and around Baghdad. That is an excellent reason to continue the operations.
But it is important to realize that the more troops we have in harm's way, the more casualties our soldiers will face in the near term. One of the most important reasons we are seeing more casualties now than we have seen in recent years is because troops are actively engaged on the front lines and are living in the communities in which they are patrolling, as opposed to dozens of miles away in protected enclaves known as FOB's (or forward operating bases).
As Abu Sarhan notes in the article, the solution to this conflict is political. But we cannot get a favorable political solution without security. After all, if you are a Sunni or a Shiite in a Baghdad neighborhood, all you want is safety to walk down the street and civil services, such as power, water, etc. back. And you will provide information to the Americans (i.e. where the IED's are hidden) only if you believe they will protect you against the bad guys. If they believe the Americans will be redeploying and jeopardizing their safety, they won't help the Americans at all.
Finally, the article is instructive as to the consequences of American withdrawal from its counterinsurgency operations: a significant enhancement of the civil war in Baghdad. Everyone wants to compare this fight to Vietnam, but a more apt comparison is probably to Lebanon in the 1980's. As we pulled out, a devastating civil war broke out which, to this day, has not gotten better, as we can see by recent Lebanese military action into refugee camps. Perhaps this is the model we should be prepared to accept should American forces withdraw: Baghdad looking like Beirut.
The article provides an interesting look into the structure, coordination and mindset of the insurgent groups in Iraq. It also featured a plea, appealing to American popular opinion to support a redeployment of troops away from the center of the country.
The insurgent leader, going by the nom de guerre Abu Sarhan (father of first born son, Sarhan), suggests that America's recent counterinsurgency operations have increased the attacks against Americans. That is fairly self-evident. Abu Sarhan suggests that the insurgent groups are not against what America is trying to do, but they are taking the wrong path. They like America, but hate Shiites and only ask that America get out of the way so they may intensify the battle (civil war) against Shiite militias. America can do this by removing the cordons around Baghdad communities, withdrawing soldiers and stop looking for Sunni insurgents.
While this article seems to be a thinly veiled perspective that our efforts are futile, I disagree wholeheartedly. I believe that anyone who believes that we are making an appropriate counter-insurgent effort can see that our efforts are working. The insurgent groups are asking us to stop it. From a political perspective, this implies that we are starting to win over the support of communities in and around Baghdad. That is an excellent reason to continue the operations.
But it is important to realize that the more troops we have in harm's way, the more casualties our soldiers will face in the near term. One of the most important reasons we are seeing more casualties now than we have seen in recent years is because troops are actively engaged on the front lines and are living in the communities in which they are patrolling, as opposed to dozens of miles away in protected enclaves known as FOB's (or forward operating bases).
As Abu Sarhan notes in the article, the solution to this conflict is political. But we cannot get a favorable political solution without security. After all, if you are a Sunni or a Shiite in a Baghdad neighborhood, all you want is safety to walk down the street and civil services, such as power, water, etc. back. And you will provide information to the Americans (i.e. where the IED's are hidden) only if you believe they will protect you against the bad guys. If they believe the Americans will be redeploying and jeopardizing their safety, they won't help the Americans at all.
Finally, the article is instructive as to the consequences of American withdrawal from its counterinsurgency operations: a significant enhancement of the civil war in Baghdad. Everyone wants to compare this fight to Vietnam, but a more apt comparison is probably to Lebanon in the 1980's. As we pulled out, a devastating civil war broke out which, to this day, has not gotten better, as we can see by recent Lebanese military action into refugee camps. Perhaps this is the model we should be prepared to accept should American forces withdraw: Baghdad looking like Beirut.
Monday, July 09, 2007
The Post Surge Strategy
Certain politicians, most recently Richard Luger (R - IN) have been attempting to advance the idea that they would like to withdraw troops from the center of Iraq (specifically from neighborhoods in and around Baghdad soldiers are clearing and attempting to hold currently) and position them on the outskirts of the country to train Iraqi troops and police officers. He said he "would support a significant withdrawal that left residual forces in Iraq to ensure that the whole area does not blow up."
I appreciate politicians trying to do to find compromise between "surge" and "withdraw," but my question for Senator Luger is, "What should we do if all hell breaks loose." Should we send our soldiers into a melee? Frankly, I think this is a ludicrous solution. Our policy makers have two clear options in this scenario: continue the counterinsurgency or withdraw all of our forces. Period. In this particular scenario, there is no middle ground.
Regardless of how we got here, we need to determine what are the consequences of our actions. What is the least bad option? Some politicians (including my beloved Ron Paul) would like to argue that, as in Vietnam, people argued about all the possible negative outcomes and the results weren't as bad as advertised. I can't say exactly if that is true. What I do know is that the North Vietnamese army exacted revenge upon those who cooperated with Americans to the tune of the deaths and incarcerations of tens of thousands of South Vietnamese. Additionally, our withdrawal created instability in the region, perhaps allowing the genocide in Cambodia to begin shortly thereafter.
Will that happen again? Is working for stability in the Middle East in the US interest? Will instability in the region be decreased or enhanced by our precipitous withdrawal? My guess is that stability in this region is in our interest and this will be enhanced by our counterinsurgency efforts. However, only history will be able to say.
For a good primer on exactly what is entailed in the "Surge," please see the following link:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/06/understanding-current-operatio/
I appreciate politicians trying to do to find compromise between "surge" and "withdraw," but my question for Senator Luger is, "What should we do if all hell breaks loose." Should we send our soldiers into a melee? Frankly, I think this is a ludicrous solution. Our policy makers have two clear options in this scenario: continue the counterinsurgency or withdraw all of our forces. Period. In this particular scenario, there is no middle ground.
Regardless of how we got here, we need to determine what are the consequences of our actions. What is the least bad option? Some politicians (including my beloved Ron Paul) would like to argue that, as in Vietnam, people argued about all the possible negative outcomes and the results weren't as bad as advertised. I can't say exactly if that is true. What I do know is that the North Vietnamese army exacted revenge upon those who cooperated with Americans to the tune of the deaths and incarcerations of tens of thousands of South Vietnamese. Additionally, our withdrawal created instability in the region, perhaps allowing the genocide in Cambodia to begin shortly thereafter.
Will that happen again? Is working for stability in the Middle East in the US interest? Will instability in the region be decreased or enhanced by our precipitous withdrawal? My guess is that stability in this region is in our interest and this will be enhanced by our counterinsurgency efforts. However, only history will be able to say.
For a good primer on exactly what is entailed in the "Surge," please see the following link:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/06/understanding-current-operatio/
Parker Goes to the Zoo
Today, Kari took Parker to the zoo and brought along her mom, her friend Erin, and her two kids.
Friday, July 06, 2007
Another Birthday Toy
Parker got a pool from his Grandparents, Ray and Karen. Additionally, he received a bathing suit from my Aunt and Uncle, Mary Lee and David when he was born. It was a beautiful Summer Day (83 degrees) and Kari filled the pool and took Parker for a dip.
New Swing
One of Parker's birthday presents is a swing from his Aunt Kim. Above are some pictures from his toy, which we have mounted on the dogwood out front.
Starting to Walk
Parker has been making great strides walking. For about two months, he has been an expert at pulling himself up and standing straight. Within the past three weeks, he has gotten pretty good at taking 4-5 quick steps, or falling forward, as I call it.
And just yesterday, he took the initiative to stand up and walked from the bathroom to the bedroom on his own (probably 20 steps or so). It is only a matter of time before we'll be chasing him around the house.
Parker's First Birthday
Above is the birthday boy in his homemade outfit and birthday hat.
Above, Kari is reading to Parker from the baseball book from Noanie.
He wasn't quite sure about the cupcakes at first.
As you can see, he adjusted to the cakes after a while. In fact, he was blowing blue frosting out of his nose the next day.
In this picture, he is wondering if the frosting coordinates with Daddy's shirt.
Tuesday, July 03, 2007
Chechnya: Life in a War Torn Society
"Chechnya" is a fascinating account of two wars fought between Russia and its semi-autonomous republic, Chechnya, during the 1990's.
The author, Valery Tishkov, details the accounts of many Chechans and Russians who were impacted by these brutal wars, which led to the deaths of tens of thousands and the complete destruction of many Chechan cities, including Grozny (pictured below).
The author, Valery Tishkov, details the accounts of many Chechans and Russians who were impacted by these brutal wars, which led to the deaths of tens of thousands and the complete destruction of many Chechan cities, including Grozny (pictured below).
The premise of the book is to determine what started the war and what did people actually think, once you get beyond the propoganda. He discovered that despite information to the contrary, Chechnya at large did not have a mutli-century hatred for Russia. He also found that while it was an easy excuse, Stalin's deportations were not the root cause behind the conflict. Tishkov believes that certain factions, including outsiders, fanned the flames and increased the rhetoric, but that at the end of the day, this was a conflict that got out of hand.
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, leaders within Chechnya declared their independence. They raided a Soviet military outpost, looting all the weapons. The Soviets responded by sending troops. The troops were young, inexperienced and underprepared. Many were drunk and committed atrocities. The Chechans responded in-kind leading to a cottage industry of kidnapping.
Each side countered the other's atrocities with greater atrocities. The violence just spiraled out of control.
This account is extremely interesting and does provide some great firsthand accounts of these wars.
Spy Wars by Tenant H Bagley
"Spy Wars" is an insider account of CIA Operations Officer, Tenant "Pete" Bagley. The crux of this story is that Bagley was an operations officer in Switzerland when KGB Officer, Yuri Nosenko offered to provide information to the United States government. Nosenko claimed to be a Lieutenant Colonel in the KGB and was in Switzerland for a conference.
This is the most contentious story in the short history of the CIA. Two years following this fateful meeting, Nosenko defected to the United States. He claimed to have information about Lee Harvey Oswald, who had recently assassinated President John Kennedy. Nosenko claimed the KGB had nothing to do with the assassination and that he personally handled Oswald's file. While the KGB had interviewed him, they viewed him to be an unreliable nut job and wouldn't meet with him again.
Since this case has not been settled, and even the recent release of the CIA's "Family Jewels" (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/family_jewels_full_ocr.pdf) did not shed much more light on the subject , I will offer my personal opinion.
Warning! This is my personal opinion. Warning!
Yuri Nosenko was a low level bureaucrat in the Russian Government. He may even have worked at the KGB, but was never an operations officer, let along a Lieutenant Colonel. He was dispatched by Moscow to offer information contradicting what a legitimate defector, Anatoly Golitsin had been revealing. While Nosenko did reveal bona fide Russian secrets, these had already been compromised or were long since irrelevant to the KGB.
Nosenko was instructed to defect after President Kennedy's assasination. While the KGB had nothing to do with the assassination, Nosenko's circuitous and incomplete story led some in the agency to believe the KGB was involved. However, this defection was simply the KGB's way of letting the United States know (through back channels) that it had nothing to do with the assassination.
Interrogations (including hostile as referenced by the Family Jewels above) proceeded to allow those involved to see the Nosenko was such a low level individual as to know nothing about KGB headquarters or how a KGB officer would go about his normal routine (where is the cafeteria, where is the bathroom, which is the best parking lot if you are trying to get to Building C kind of stuff).
The hostile interrogation provided enough cover for compromised people within the CIA to remove the entire Soviet Bureau and some Counterintelligence Staff from their positions and replace them with people utterly inexperienced in dealing with Russia. This allowed certain "moles" within the CIA to continue to provide information to the Russians and not be exposed for more than two decades, including Aldrich Ames, who was responsible for exposing several CIA agents (Russian KGB officers providing intel to the CIA).
Bagley was the officer who ran Yuri Nosenko and was in a position to know. We may never know the real truth, but this book is probably as good as it is going to get.
This is the most contentious story in the short history of the CIA. Two years following this fateful meeting, Nosenko defected to the United States. He claimed to have information about Lee Harvey Oswald, who had recently assassinated President John Kennedy. Nosenko claimed the KGB had nothing to do with the assassination and that he personally handled Oswald's file. While the KGB had interviewed him, they viewed him to be an unreliable nut job and wouldn't meet with him again.
Since this case has not been settled, and even the recent release of the CIA's "Family Jewels" (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/family_jewels_full_ocr.pdf) did not shed much more light on the subject , I will offer my personal opinion.
Warning! This is my personal opinion. Warning!
Yuri Nosenko was a low level bureaucrat in the Russian Government. He may even have worked at the KGB, but was never an operations officer, let along a Lieutenant Colonel. He was dispatched by Moscow to offer information contradicting what a legitimate defector, Anatoly Golitsin had been revealing. While Nosenko did reveal bona fide Russian secrets, these had already been compromised or were long since irrelevant to the KGB.
Nosenko was instructed to defect after President Kennedy's assasination. While the KGB had nothing to do with the assassination, Nosenko's circuitous and incomplete story led some in the agency to believe the KGB was involved. However, this defection was simply the KGB's way of letting the United States know (through back channels) that it had nothing to do with the assassination.
Interrogations (including hostile as referenced by the Family Jewels above) proceeded to allow those involved to see the Nosenko was such a low level individual as to know nothing about KGB headquarters or how a KGB officer would go about his normal routine (where is the cafeteria, where is the bathroom, which is the best parking lot if you are trying to get to Building C kind of stuff).
The hostile interrogation provided enough cover for compromised people within the CIA to remove the entire Soviet Bureau and some Counterintelligence Staff from their positions and replace them with people utterly inexperienced in dealing with Russia. This allowed certain "moles" within the CIA to continue to provide information to the Russians and not be exposed for more than two decades, including Aldrich Ames, who was responsible for exposing several CIA agents (Russian KGB officers providing intel to the CIA).
Bagley was the officer who ran Yuri Nosenko and was in a position to know. We may never know the real truth, but this book is probably as good as it is going to get.
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